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Abstract Anthropology has conventionally taken as some of its most cherished
foundational categories the precise opposites of the key concepts that animate this
inquiry: rather than ‘‘bare life,’’ anthropology has tended always to emphasize the
fullness and complexity of social and political life; instead of labor in the abstract,
which we recognize in its commodified form as ‘‘labor-power,’’ anthropology has
produced exquisite inventories of concrete laboring activities and the ‘‘cultural’’
content of productive work; against the impermanence and mutability of lives
characterized by their mobility, the ethnographic enterprise has been deeply
attached to the sedentarist presuppositions of lasting settlement, dwelling, and
‘‘community’’; and contrary to the task of apprehending space on a global scale,
ethnographic study has been overwhelmingly localized and place-bound. Rethink-
ing these elementary premises of the ethnographic endeavor and situating these
critical concepts at the center of our epistemological frameworks are crucial theo-
retical and practical tasks for any meaningful social inquiry today. In this regard, the
Marxian theoretical arsenal is simply indispensable. But, in the derisive words of so
many disciplinary forebears and overseers, is this properly ‘‘anthropological’’? The
prospective convergence of genuinely critical sociopolitical inquiry with the tech-
niques and insights of anthropology must remain for us the locus of an urgent
problem—an open question on an open horizon.
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Confronted with the protracted global ‘‘crisis’’ of the world capitalist system, it
behooves us to recall Walter Benjamin’s incisive reminder that ‘‘the tradition of the
oppressed teaches us that the ‘state of emergency’ in which we live is not the
exception but the rule’’ (1940 [1968:257]). Under the global regime of capital
accumulation as we know it, crisis has truly become a way of life (cf. Klein 2007;
Loewenstein 2015; Mirowski 2013). Indeed, there has been a veritable proliferation
of ‘‘crisis’’ talk across the full spectrum of contemporary sociopolitical life (see, for
example, De Genova and Tazzioli 2016). Yet, Benjamin’s ever-prophetic injunc-
tion—no matter how often piously cited—seems to go always unheeded. Our
interpretive and analytical traditions tend to be stubbornly impervious to the
exigencies and urgent mandates of an intractable and unrelenting state of
emergency. Benjamin goes on: ‘‘Where we perceive a [mere] chain of events,
[history] sees one single catastrophe which keeps piling wreckage upon wreck-
age…’’ (1940 [1968:257]). Perceiving these developments only serially (as mere
events), we witness this singular accumulation of disastrous tragedies and atrocities,
and we inherit the perverse and invidious consequences. We live amidst the
wreckages and convert them into the predicates of a way of life. Our social science
and historiography descriptively document and record the results. But somehow the
urgency of the veritable cataclysm seems to elude our tools of thought.
Our strategies and tactics for changing the world command an interpretation that
uncompromisingly inhabits with us the state of emergency in which we live, an
analysis that never retreats from crisis-as-a-way-of-life and refuses to avert its
critical gaze from the abominable wreckage of a world characterized, now as in
Marx’s time, by ‘‘uninterrupted disturbance of all social conditions, everlasting
uncertainty and agitation,’’ in which ‘‘all that is solid melts into air’’ (Marx and
Engels 1848 [1967:83]). In his closing lines to The Poverty of Philosophy, Marx
declares that ‘‘the last word of social science’’ must be ‘‘combat or death; bloody
struggle or extinction [nothingness]’’ (1847 [1963:175]).1 Still earlier, in his
Introduction to the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, Marx similarly invoked
this dire nexus between struggle and science, between combat and critique:
The weapon of criticism certainly cannot replace the criticism of weapons;
material force must be overthrown by material force; but theory, too, becomes
a material force once it seizes the masses…. once it becomes radical. To be
radical is to grasp matters at the root. But for man the root is man himself
(1844 [1970:137]).
Thus, we may better appreciate that the irascible young Marx’s revolutionary
impatience for a practical disposition adequate to a world where emergency is the
rule rather than the exception was no less exigent in its demand for a rigorously
radical critique, indeed, a theory capable of truly apprehending the human condition
itself. This would seem to suggest, in other words, the necessity for an adequately
radical anthropology, in the most fundamentally philosophical sense of the word.
1 Marx quotes George Sand’s novel Jean Zˇiska, in French; in the accompanying endnote, the unnamed
International Publishers editor translates le ne´ant as ‘‘extinction,’’ but I include the perhaps more direct
translation—‘‘nothingness’’—as a more philosophically suggestive alternate gloss.
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Anthropology as an academic discipline, on the other hand, has conventionally
taken as some of its most cherished foundational categories the precise opposites of
some of the key concepts that animate what might be characterized as a genuinely
Marxian ‘‘anthropology.’’ In the present inquiry, I am particularly interested in
revisiting some classically Marxian categories of analysis—species being, abstract
labor/labor-power, the mobility of labor, and an appreciation of the truly global
scale and configuration of capitalism—as well as the less obviously Marxian
concept of bare life, proposed by Giorgio Agamben. It seems evident that none of
these terms has ever fit very well with the conventions of the institutionalized
academic discipline of sociocultural anthropology. Rather than ‘‘bare’’ life—a
figure of generic, even empty, humanity—anthropology has tended always to
emphasize the fullness and complexity of social and political life; instead of labor in
the abstract, which we recognize in its commodified form as labor-power,
anthropology has produced exquisite inventories of concrete laboring activities
and the ‘‘cultural’’ content of productive work; against the impermanence and
mutability of lives characterized by their mobility, the ethnographic enterprise has
been deeply attached to the sedentarist presuppositions of lasting settlement,
dwelling, and ‘‘community’’; and contrary to the task of apprehending space and
social life on a global scale, ethnographic study has been overwhelmingly localized
and place-bound. Rethinking these elementary premises of the ethnographic
endeavor and situating these critical concepts at the center of our epistemological
frameworks, I will argue, are crucial theoretical and practical tasks for any
meaningful social inquiry today. In this regard, the Marxian theoretical arsenal is
simply indispensable. But as Marx contended, that theory can only become a
subversive material force to the extent that it can truly grasp and critically
problematize the contemporary human predicament. Or, in other words, our theory
will only be genuinely radical to the extent that it is truly ‘‘anthropological.’’ Here,
of course, I have in mind no sort of narcissistic exercise of morbid disciplinary
anthropological self-congratulation. To the contrary, I am rather more inclined to
expect that the discipline of anthropology as we know it, like all other forms of
disciplinary knowledge, would most likely be incapable of sustaining the shocks and
convulsions of this sort of theoretical (and methodological) reckoning. Indeed, it
will be incumbent upon us to confront the inevitable demand, as posed in the
derisive words of so many of anthropology’s disciplinary forebears and overseers: Is
this properly ‘‘anthropological’’? The prospective convergence of genuinely critical
(Marxian, dialectical) sociopolitical inquiry with the techniques and insights of
anthropology, therefore, must remain for us the locus of an urgent problem—an
open question on an open horizon.
Already I have introduced the rather robust proposition that these four conceptual
terms—bare life, abstract labor/labor-power, mobility, and global space—are of
indispensable interpretive and critical salience for any meaningful social inquiry
today. It will therefore be instructive to consider each of these analytic categories in
turn.
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Bare life: and the afterlife of species being
Whereas I have affiliated the four organizing concepts of this essay to what I am
designating to be the Marxian theoretical arsenal, some will surely and promptly
object that the idea of bare life is plainly not a strictly or properly Marxian category
at all. Let us have a closer look.
In its barest distillation, the concept of bare life, as elaborated by Giorgio
Agamben (1995), is only apprehensible in contrast to the plenitude of ways in which
human beings really live, namely within and through one or another ensemble of
social relations. Bare life is, then, a conceptual foil for all the historically specific
and socially particular forms in which human (‘‘biological’’) life is qualified by its
inscription within one or another sociopolitical order. That is to say, ‘‘bare’’ or
‘‘naked’’ life may be understood to be what remains when human existence, while
yet alive, is nonetheless stripped of all the encumbrances of social location and
juridical identity and thus bereft of all the qualifications for properly political
inclusion and belonging (cf. 1999/2002). In this respect, bare life is made to
resemble some sort of pure animality of the human species. But of course, this is
never true of human existence. The human animal is inextricably a social animal,
and that sociality is always inherently historically particular. Bare life, therefore, is
an impossible figure of the generic species life of the human animal, treated
abstractly. Notably, Agamben is prudent about not reifying or essentializing bare
life. Thus, bare life remains an ‘‘empty’’ signifier, an ‘‘indeterminate concept’’
(1995/1998:182).2 Put somewhat differently, bare life—for Agamben himself—is a
kind of political fiction. But what is crucial here is to appreciate that, in Agamben’s
account, modern state power requires and conjures into being precisely this fictive
human beast, this naked figure of life bereft, as a necessary premise for the
authorization of its own sovereignty. If Agamben is correct, then the matter at hand
is not to go hunting for convincing exemplars of an ‘‘authentic’’ bare life, but rather
to recognize this grotesquely dehumanized, radically denuded figure of our species
existence as the defining horizon toward which we are always already unrelentingly
driven, albeit unevenly and unequally in each particular instance. If we have the
tenacity to posit humanity as a unitary and universal figure of global political
significance, and I believe that we must—even if we simultaneously acknowledge
that it may indeed be a kind of normative but necessary fiction—then we are
compelled to engage the problematic organized around the comparably fictive idea
of bare life.
Bare life, according to Agamben, is literally produced by sovereign (state)
power: ‘‘the production of bare life’’ is ‘‘the fundamental activity of sovereign
power.’’ Bare life presents itself, however, as the ‘‘originary political element.’’ It is
made to appear, in other words, as something elemental, rudimentary, primeval,
‘‘essential,’’ indeed, ‘‘biological.’’ As a ‘‘threshold of articulation between [human
life as] nature and [human life as] culture,’’ however, it must be perennially and
incessantly banned or expunged from the political and legal order (1995/1998:181).
2 Agamben explains: ‘‘For bare life is certainly as indeterminate and impenetrable as [pure Being], and
one could say that reason cannot think bare life except… in stupor and astonishment’’ (1995/1998:182).
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Nevertheless, this banishment or abandonment of bare life by sovereign (state)
power, which excludes it from all political life and denies it any juridical validity,
inescapably implicates it in ‘‘a continuous relationship’’ (183). In a sense, we may
understand sovereign power to legitimate itself by means of a kind of rescue
operation, recuperating human (properly social) life from this spectral double that
resides stubbornly within the physical materiality of the human species, but only
phantasmagorically, as a putatively ‘‘natural’’ or ‘‘animal’’ (debased) mode of
(human) being. Bare life is for the state a kind of excess that grounds it, the shadowy
cipher of a human foundation that must be thoroughly and rigorously domesticated,
upon which the edifice of sovereign power may be erected, but only by
cannibalizing it. Whatever remains as an excess—bare life—becomes intolerable,
and must be banished. Indeed, inasmuch as it is precisely the regimentation of our
social relations and identities by state power that radically separates the phantom of
our naked (animal) life from the real (social) lives we lead, bare life in Agamben’s
account perfectly ‘‘expresses our subjection to political power’’ (182).3
Accompanying its rapid and diffuse prominence in recent scholarly discourse, the
concept of bare life has been rather too presumptively and reductively degraded to a
mere figure of abject ‘‘exclusion.’’ Agamben’s formulation is rather more subtle,
however, as it revolves around ‘‘the zone of indistinction between outside and
inside, exclusion and inclusion’’ (181). It is precisely the politicization of bare life
that Agamben depicts as the defining ‘‘threshold’’ where the relation between the
living (human) being and the sociopolitical order gets substantiated, and where
sovereign state power therefore presumes to decide upon and inscribe the humanity
of living men and women within its normative and juridical order (8). Thus,
Agamben posits a frankly predatory relation between sovereign (state) power and
bare or naked (human) life, which is founded always upon their mutually
constitutive separation (1996/2000:4; cf. 2003/2005:87).
Bare life—as the reification of a notion of human life that could somehow be
merely and purely ‘‘biological’’—is, for Agamben, precisely not a biological given
that ontologically precedes sovereign power, as if in a ‘‘state of nature.’’ Rather,
bare life is precisely a ‘‘product of the [biopolitical] machine’’ (2003/2005:87–88;
emphasis added). Bare life, in other words, is for Agamben the degradation and
debasement of the species specificity of human life. Bare life is ‘‘that naked
supposedly common element that is always possible to isolate in each of the
numerous forms of life’’; against this, Agamben’s political radicality resides in
positing the prospective horizon of ‘‘a life that can never be separated from its
form’’ (1996/2000:3).4 Thus, Agamben’s analysis of this constitutive separation
3 It is important to note that Agamben’s conception of bare life is substantially an elaboration of Walter
Benjamin’s discussion of mere life in his ‘‘Critique of Violence’’ (1921/1979:151–53), wherein mere life
signals the point where ‘‘the rule of law over the living ceases’’ because law-making violence is a ‘‘bloody
power over mere life’’ for the sake of nothing but that same violence (151). I am grateful to Nahum
Chandler for pressing me on this point. Agamben acknowledges this genealogy in a brief passage (1995/
1998:65).
4 Here, again, it is instructive to compare Agamben’s sense with that of Benjamin, who elaborates a sense
of ‘‘mere life’’ as analogous to the notion of mere ‘‘existence’’ in contradistinction to ‘‘life’’ as ‘‘the
irreducible, total condition that is ‘man’,’’ (1921[1979:152]) and insists, ‘‘Man cannot, at any price, be
said to coincide with the mere life in him’’ (153).
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between bare life and the sociopolitical order of sovereign power aspires always to
problematize and effectively repudiate that same distinction.5 Indeed, politically,
Agamben instead seeks nothing less than a life ‘‘in which it is never possible to
isolate something such as naked [or, ‘bare’] life,’’ ‘‘a life for which what is at stake
in its way of living is living itself… in which the single ways, acts, and processes of
living are never simply facts but always and above all possibilities of life, always
and above all power’’ (1996/2000:4.; emphases in original). Thus, Agamben’s
propositions gesture toward ‘‘a life of power’’ (9; emphasis in original) predicated
upon an ‘‘irrevocable exodus from any sovereignty’’ (8), an emancipation from the
very division of sovereign (state) power and naked (‘‘biological’’) life. In contrast to
the hegemony of the separation between power and (bare) life, he in fact detects a
distinctly human mode of life that ‘‘no matter how customary, repeated, and socially
compulsory… always puts at stake living itself,’’ making human beings ‘‘the only
beings for whom happiness is always at stake in their living’’ (4), ‘‘beings that
cannot be defined by any proper operation—that is, beings of pure potentiality that
no identity or vocation can possibly exhaust’’ (141).
Here, I would contend, we are in the presence of Marx’s conception of species
being. With recourse to this term, which he adapts from Feuerbach, Marx addresses
himself in his Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844 to the problem of
theorizing the species particularity of the human. As Marx notes, ‘‘man is not
merely a natural being; he is a human natural being. That is to say, he is a being for
himself. Therefore, he is a species being…’’ (1844 [1964:182; emphases in
original]). Furthermore, Marx elaborates, ‘‘Man is a species being, not only because
in practice and in theory he adopts the species as his object (his own as well as those
of other things), but… also because he treats himself as the actual, living species;
because he treats himself as a universal and therefore a free being’’ (1844
[1964:112; emphasis in original]). In spite of our manifold differences, therefore,
and in whatever terms we may adopt to do so, we universally posit our own human
generality—we posit our own specificities always as encompassed by the universal
inclusivity of the human species. Perhaps most crucially, we may appreciate Marx’s
sense of species being when he clarifies it thus: ‘‘The whole character of a species—
its species character—is contained in the character of its life activity; and free,
conscious activity is man’s species character.’’ What exactly constitutes the
particular life activity of the human species? ‘‘Labor, life-activity, productive life
itself… is the life of the species. It is life-engendering life’’ (113).
Thus, it is our creative capacity and productive power that distinguish a kind of
existential vocation of our species. In its generality and open-endedness, this
potential is not reducible to any particularity. Or, as Agamben puts it, such an
existential predisposition is precisely a ‘‘pure potentiality that no identity or
vocation can possibly exhaust.’’ Indeed, Marx continues, ‘‘it is only because [man]
is a species being that he is a conscious being, i.e. that his own life is an object for
him’’ (113). The free (un-compelled and un-predetermined), conscious (purposive)
5 This is a crucial point that tends to be lost in more de-politicized readings of Agamben, which are
usually restricted to readings of Homo Sacer (1995), a more esoteric text than the one from which this
quote is excerpted, which likewise lends itself to a more narrowly Foucauldean interpretation.
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life activity by which human beings materially and practically (re)produce the life
of the species as such is, then, to recall Agamben’s phrase, a continuous putting at
stake of living itself, as well as ‘‘happiness’’ or satisfaction as a conscious aim and
objective of that living.
What Agamben glosses as the ‘‘pure potentiality’’ that distinguishes human life
can be inferred directly from what Marx distinguishes as the specificity of the
human, which he designates as species being. And it is in juxtaposition with this
figure of the always constitutively incomplete projects of inexhaustible human
possibility that Agamben discerns the abject spectral figure of bare life. In this
regard, bare life is apprehensible as a negative, inverted foil for species being.
Operating as a debased (merely ‘‘natural’’/‘‘animal’’) generalization of the life of the
human species, bare life nonetheless serves as a kind of universal (species) limit
upon the innumerable and heterogeneous particularities orchestrated or imposed by
sovereign power in its manifold juridical and normative regimentations of social
life. In other words, although it is a negative and empty figure, bare life nevertheless
recapitulates a kind of human universality.
We may appreciate Marx’s perspective anew if we situate his thoughts on species
being in direct relation to his critical reflections on the notion of ‘‘human nature,’’
and the relationship between the putative human ‘‘essence’’ and nature. In Thesis
Six of his ‘‘Theses of Feuerbach,’’ Marx memorably repudiates the notion of
‘‘human nature’’ (which ‘‘can be comprehended only as ‘genus’, as an internal,
dumb generality which naturally unites the many individuals’’); in contrast, he
argues that ‘‘the human essence is no abstraction inherent in each single individual.
In its reality, it is the ensemble of the social relations’’ (1846 [1970:122]; emphasis
in original). Thus, Marx concisely dismisses altogether the philosophical center-
piece of bourgeois ideology in favor of the proposition that whatsoever might be
characterized as ‘‘human nature’’ is radically contingent and refers us always to the
materiality and practicality of social relations as they are configured within
historically specific social formations, ‘‘particular form[s] of society’’ (Thesis
Seven; p. 122). Nonetheless, in the Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844,
Marx addresses the question somewhat differently, and in a manner that is
revelatory for our purposes of assessing bare life as a kind of asocial ‘‘natural’’ (or
‘‘biological’’) dimension of the human species. In his critique of the Hegelian
dialectic in the last manuscript, Marx is emphatically interested in the question of
so-called ‘‘human nature’’ from the standpoint of re-situating the figure of the
human within nature. Rejecting the idealist philosophical conceit that treats of the
human as ‘‘a non-objective, spiritual being’’ (1844 [1964:178; emphasis in
original]), Marx is expressly concerned with the human as a natural (organic,
material, objective) being and therefore as ‘‘a part of nature’’ (112). As Marx puts it,
the philosophical figure ‘‘Man’’ ought to be understood as nothing other than
‘‘human Nature’’—Nature in its specifically human form; ‘‘real, corporeal man, man
with his feet firmly on the solid ground, man exhaling and inhaling all the forces of
nature… at bottom he is nature’’ (180). As an objective and natural living being, the
human consequently exists in a constant (metabolic) relation to external (objective)
nature: ‘‘Man lives on nature—means that nature is his body, with which he must
remain in continuous interchange if he is not to die’’ (112; emphasis in original]).
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In Marx’s account, it is precisely through the practical work in which human
beings engage with the objective, external world, and therefore materially objectify
human creative energies that the species self-consciousness of human life is made
possible. ‘‘To say that man is a corporeal, living, real, sensuous objective being full
of natural vigor is to say that he has real, sensuous objects as the objects of his being
or his life’’ (181). To be an objective being, and necessarily, to therefore be the
object of external forces, is also to take the (external) natural world as the object of
one’s activity. ‘‘The object of labor is… the objectification of man’s species life: for
he duplicates himself… in reality, and therefore he contemplates himself in a world
he has created.’’ The objective realization of human productive activity therefore
manifests ‘‘species life’’ as ‘‘[man’s] real objectivity as a member of the species’’
(114; emphases in original). In this way, the concept of species being for Marx is
inseparable from an appreciation of the material and practical objectivity of the
human within nature and as nature, but nevertheless constantly acting (subjectively)
on external nature, in a mutually constitutive process of self-objectification.
For Marx, who rejects what he considers to be Feuerbach’s ‘‘passive’’ (or
‘‘contemplative’’) materialism (1846), this relation between the human and external
nature manifests itself always as dynamic, purposive, creative (subjective)
activity—labor—which is transformative of those external circumstances, and
effectively re-makes that same ‘‘natural’’ world itself, such that nature itself has by
now been thoroughly and completely humanized. Indeed, Marx suggests that human
species being consists in a universality that engages practically in enlarging ‘‘the
sphere of inorganic nature’’ which human beings appropriate (not simply as means
of subsistence but as the material object of our defining life activity), such that
‘‘nature is man’s inorganic body’’ (1844 [1964:112; emphasis in original]). ‘‘In
creating a world of objects by his practical activity, in his work upon inorganic
nature, man proves himself a conscious species being… man reproduces the whole
of nature’’ (113; emphases in original). In this sense, all of social life assumes the
form of a ‘‘second nature,’’ and in fact encompasses the ostensibly natural world
itself. As Marx declares, ‘‘nature… taken abstractly, for itself—nature fixed in
isolation from man—is nothing for man’’(1844 [1964: 191; emphases in original]).
And further: ‘‘Nature as nature… nature isolated… is nothing… is devoid of sense’’
(192; emphases in original]). In The German Ideology, Marx and Engels revisit this
point, polemically, in opposition to Feuerbach’s materialism:
So much is this activity, this unceasing sensuous labor and creation, this
production, the basis of the whole sensuous world as it now exists that were it
interrupted for only a year, Feuerbach would not only find an enormous
change in the natural world, but would very soon find that the whole world of
men and his own perceptive faculty, nay his own existence, were missing. Of
course, in all of this the priority of external nature [to human consciousness]
remains unassailed… but this differentiation has meaning only insofar as man
is considered to be distinct from nature. For that matter, nature, the nature that
preceded human history, is… nature which no longer exists anywhere… (1846
[1970:63]).
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Thus, ‘‘history’’—that is, the history of human social life—‘‘is the true natural
history of man’’ (1844 [1970:182]), and that history is but the succession of distinct
modes for producing material life, entailing ‘‘definite form[s] of activity’’ and
‘‘definite form[s] of expressing… life’’ (Marx and Engels 1846 [1970:42]).
It ought to be plain by now that something like human nature is, for Marx, utterly
malleable and mutable. The human ‘‘essence’’ is no more nor less than its essential
sociality, which is itself inseparable from its purposive activity, its multifarious
labors. The purported ‘‘essence’’ of humankind emerges therefore as but the
historically specific and radically contingent manifestation of different modes of
productive activity: ‘‘As individuals express their life, so they are. What they are,
therefore, coincides with their production, both with what they produce and with
how they produce [and]… depends upon the material conditions determining their
production’’ (Marx and Engels 1846 [1970:42; emphases in original]). Productive
activity is ‘‘the real basis of what the philosophers have conceived as ‘substance’
and ‘essence of man’.’’ In an idealist conception of history that denigrates that
productive activity, Marx and Engels argue that ‘‘the truly historical appears to be
separated from ordinary life’’: ‘‘the relation of man to nature is excluded from
history and hence the antithesis of nature and history is created’’ (1846 [1970:59]).
Marx reconfirms this standpoint in Volume One of Capital:
[M]an, through his own actions, mediates, regulates, and controls the
metabolism between himself and nature… as a force of nature… Through
this movement, he acts upon external nature and changes it, and in this way
simultaneously changes his own nature. He develops the potentialities
slumbering within nature, and subjects the play of its forces to his own
sovereign power (1867/1976:283; emphasis added).6
Thus, the sheer productive power and creative capacity of human life, the pure
potentiality of our vital forces—which we recognize by means of a sometimes
misleading short-circuit under the heading of labor—are for Marx the manifestation
of a kind of threshold—to revisit Agamben’s phrase, a ‘‘threshold of articulation
between [human life as] nature and [human life as] culture’’ (1995/1998:181).7
Notably, for Marx, this threshold is constantly being crossed, undergoing the
practical purposive activity that mediates ‘‘the metabolism’’ between the human
species and nature.
6 For a more expanded consideration of the significance of Marx’s explicit positing of a conception of
‘‘sovereign power’’ in this passage, in relation to Agamben, see De Genova (2010).
7 For heuristic purposes here, Marx analyzes labor transhistorically—‘‘independently of any specific
social formation’’ (1867/1976:283), and ‘‘in a form in which it is an exclusively human characteristic,’’
which is to say, with an emphatic distinction between the consciously premeditated and purposeful
characteristic of human labor and the instinctual work of some other species, such as bees constructing a
hive or beavers building dams (283–84). This sense of the inextricability of human species-life from
labor, for Marx, only thereafter is further specified in terms of the decisive analytical difference between
the labor process in general (i.e. ‘‘independently of any specific social formation’’ [1867/1976:283], ‘‘in
its simple and abstract elements… [as] a universal condition for the metabolic interaction of man and
nature, the everlasting nature-imposed condition of human existence… common to all forms of society’’
[290]) and the labor process as one of alienation and exploitation, ‘‘by which the capitalist consumes
labor-power’’ (291).
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What figures for Marx as labor—in its ontological, transhistorical sense—is the
practical expression of species being, and it is precisely this that comes to be
alienated and estranged within capitalist social relations (1844 [1964:106–19]).
Similarly, the ‘‘pure potentiality’’ that is not reducible to any particular operation,
identity, or vocation, which Agamben identifies with the specificity of the human,
may be understood to be the positivity that comes to be banned by sovereign (state)
power as bare life. Thus, bare life is activated as a negative foil for the ever open-
ended universality of the human species, in contradistinction to and unrelenting
separation from the plenitude of particular juridically inscribed identities. In effect,
when Agamben depicts the separation of social life from the ostensibly ‘‘natural’’/
‘‘animal’’/‘‘biological’’ life of the human species, he is describing a condition of
political–juridical estrangement. Bare life is the figure that operates as a
condensation of that relation of distinctly political alienation. It can be taken to
be the specifically political complement to Marx’s analysis of estranged labor.
Much as we can scarcely comprehend human life within the global regime of
capital accumulation without recourse to Marx’s account of the alienation of labor,
the concept of bare life as the political alienation of human potential and creative
power would seem to supply an indispensable counterpart. It invokes, albeit in
estranged and debased form, a specter of the universality of human species life.
Moreover, Agamben’s conception of bare life recalls Hannah Arendt’s chilling
account of the stateless refugee who emerges as the awful ‘‘specimen of an animal
species, called man’’—a ‘‘human being in general… without a citizenship’’ (1951/
1968: 302) who enacts and embodies ‘‘the abstract nakedness of being human and
nothing but human’’ (297). To paraphrase Benjamin, then, we may say that the
tradition of the refugees teaches us that the state of emergency is indeed not the
exception but the rule. The expulsion of refugees from the precincts of citizenship
into a condition of violent exposure as naked and bereft humanness also reveals the
state’s originary act of cannibalism, positing bare life only in order to domesticate it.
Thus, the resurfacing of the figure of bare life in the spectacle of the refugees’
misery instigates repetitive crises for sovereign power that can only be remediated
by their re-inscription and subjection within a global juridical and normative order.
Bare life, therefore, operates as a flashpoint, an alarm; thus, it is the sort of critical
concept that may be adequate to—and necessary for—the tasks posed for a
genuinely radical social theory. The abstraction of human life as a bare or naked
humanness now refers us directly to the decisive figure in Marx’s analysis that
entails the abstraction of human labor, and its objectification and commodification
as labor-power.
Labor-power, the ‘‘third thing’’: the phantom objectivity of abstract
labor
Alongside all the particularities and qualitative differences of the various types of
concrete labor, Marx discerned the operation of a figure of human labor in the
abstract. In fact, it would not be exaggeration to argue that the analytical category of
abstract labor is the veritable key to unlocking the whole question of value and thus
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provides an absolutely decisive and foundational theoretical feature in Marx’s
critique of capitalist social relations. For the exchange value of commodities
remains incomprehensible as long as each is not commensurable with the next in
terms of some shared ‘‘common element… a third thing’’ to which they are
reducible (1867 [1976:127]). This requires abstracting from the respective particular
(qualitative) use values in favor of something they share that differs only in a purely
quantitative way. As Marx explains:
With the disappearance of the useful character of the products of labour, the
useful character of the kinds of labour embodied in them also disappears; this
in turn entails the disappearance of the different concrete forms of labour.
They can no longer be distinguished, but are all together reduced to the same
kind of labour, human labour in the abstract.… There is nothing left of them in
each case but the same phantom-like objectivity; they are merely congealed
quantities of homogenous human labour, i.e. of human labour-power…. As
crystals of this social substance, which is common to them all, they are
values—commodity values (128).
Whereas Marx affiliated concrete (variegated) labor with the use value of the
distinct products of that labor, and therefore with the whole heterogeneous panoply
of positive, determinate, qualitative specificities—in short, with difference as such,
and therefore with the historically specific and socially or ‘‘culturally’’ distinctive
aspects of human life that anthropologists tend to prize—it was the systemic
requirement for the generic form of abstract labor that elucidated the historically
specific but global character of alienation, exploitation, and fetishism under
capitalism. Labor-power is the elusive ‘‘social substance,’’ the determinate or real
abstraction that constitutes ‘‘the objectivity of commodities as values’’ (138),
supplying all the multifarious products of diverse human creative capacities and
productive powers with an identity and equality, differentiated for the purposes of
exchange only in quantitative terms.
Marx’s analysis of an effectively universal abstraction of human productive
energies within the capital–labor relation invites us to contemplate a central
figure in any conceivable anthropology of our global condition—the alienating
objectification of human life activity as abstract labor, and its commodification as
labor-power. Precisely because abstract labor assumes the form of something
generic and homogenized, it can readily tend to fall out of the purview of
conventional anthropological inquiry. Precisely because its pervasive pertinence
assumes the form of a ‘‘phantom objectivity,’’ we may be induced to take for
granted its quite objective truth and salience. However, to fall into this familiar trap
of disregarding what seems to be ubiquitous and mundane is tantamount in fact to
neglecting exactly what ethnographic inquiry has always purportedly sought to
reveal—namely the organizing forms of social life that are evident in the quotidian
textures of everyday life.
To confront the real determinacy of abstraction in our lived everyday life is to
peer into the abyss where we are vacated of all that is particular, corporeal,
sensuous, and qualitative. Labor-power, as the ubiquitous and pragmatic reification
of the fact of our abstraction, is the sort of critical concept that confronts us with the
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crisis of our creative energies being incessantly but routinely pulverized into a
generic shadow, prosaically exchanging our vitality for a debased objecthood and
‘‘callous ‘cash payment’’’ (Marx and Engels 1848 [1967:82]). The salience of labor-
power—the sheer capacity for work, pure potentiality, now commodified for sale on
the market—presents itself in an especially compelling fashion, furthermore, when
we confront the problem of human mobility.
Mobility and the ‘‘radical chains’’ of migrant labor
As the veritable source of all value, it is not unreasonable to say that labor-power is
the premier commodity in the global circuitry of capitalist exchange. As capital has
made and relentlessly re-made the world in its own image, and according to its
chaotic requirements, bursting asunder every apparent barrier in the creation of an
ever more unobstructed global arena for profit-making and the continuous re-
consolidation of a global division of labor, moreover—necessarily, inevitably, and
arguably, above and beyond any other commodity, there has also been a
concomitant escalation in the mobility of labor-power. But in a world social order
that delegates the expressly political tasks of subordination and coercion to more
localized formations of more or less organized violence, the parameters of which are
demarcated by ‘‘national’’ borders, the global movement of homogenized, abstract
labor is finally embodied in the restless life and death of labor in a rather more
‘‘concrete’’ form—which is to say, actual migrant working men and women. Capital
can never extract from labor the abstract (eminently social) substance that is
‘‘value’’ except with recourse to the abstraction of labor-power, which, however,
can only be derived from the palpable vital energies of living labor. As an operative,
indeed decisive, category of capital accumulation, labor-power never ceases to
pertain to real flesh-and-blood working people. The accelerated mobility of labor-
power, therefore, is inseparable from the migration of actual human beings. As with
the mobility of capital itself, which exudes a pronounced indifference toward the
particular forms of the labor process where it invests in favor of a maximization of
surplus value, and is in this sense exceedingly versatile, so also with the human
mobility of labor. Migrant labor mobility is a supreme instance of flexibility,
compelled to regard the particular content of one or another type of work with
relative indifference, and to render up its labor-power wherever it may be required.
The inclination to surmount any ‘‘legal [or other] extra-economic impediments to its
freedom of movement’’ is yet another aspect of this versatility (Marx 1867 [1976:
1013]).
In the mass exodus of the Irish fleeing the potato famine of 1846, Marx
recognized what he characterized as ‘‘a systematic process’’ that not only entailed
‘‘a new way of spiriting a poor people thousands of miles away from the scene of its
misery,’’ but also served, in effect, as ‘‘one of the most lucrative branches of
[Ireland’s] export trade’’—exporting the labor-power of its surplus population while
also mobilizing the migrants themselves as a source of remittances that not only
subsidized those left behind but further fueled migration by financing the travel
costs of subsequent generations of migrants (1867 [1976:862]). From the opposite
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vantage point of the USA, Marx discerned with respect to Irish labor migration a
concomitant importation—‘‘the importation of paupers’’ (939). Depicting Ireland’s
colonial condition in terms of ‘‘a government … maintained only by bayonets and
by a state of siege sometimes open and sometimes disguised’’ (863), Marx also
discerned how the ‘‘forced immigration of poor Irishmen’’ into the industrial cities
of England had enabled the capitalist class to cultivate ‘‘two hostile camps’’ defined
by the ‘‘profound antagonism between the Irish proletariat and the English
proletariat,’’ whereby ‘‘the average English worker hates the Irish worker … [and]
regards him somewhat like the poor whites of the Southern States of North America
regard their black slaves’’ (1870 [1971:254; emphases in original]).8 Notably, then,
the homogenized abstraction of labor-power can be generated only under the aegis
of the social production of real heterogeneity and inequality, such as that which
W.E.B. Du Bois famously called ‘‘the problem of the color line’’ (1900:95, para.2;
and 104, para.19; cf. 1903), or what Partha Chatterjee has designated as ‘‘the rule of
colonial difference’’ (1993), as well as what Carole Pateman identifies as ‘‘the
sexual contract’’ (1988), and so on.9 Hence, the global class politics of human
mobility, which routinely transposes a transnational relation of capital and labor into
the ostensibly insular ‘‘national’’ politics of ‘‘immigration’’ and border policing,
ever increasingly instigates the consolidation of what E´tienne Balibar (among
others) has depicted as ‘‘a world apartheid,’’ which institutes a ‘‘color bar’’ that now
no longer merely separates the so-called ‘‘center’’ from ‘‘periphery,’’ or North from
South, but effectively runs through all ‘‘national’’ state formations (1993/2002: 82;
emphases in original; cf. Nevins 2008; Richmond 1994; Sharma 2006).
To the extent that the predicaments of migrant labor invoke the analogies of
slavery and apartheid, it is appropriate that we recall Marx’s identification of the
incipient proletariat as ‘‘a class with radical chains.’’ Here, indeed, was a class bereft
of property, with no standing in civil society, no historical entitlements, and no
particular claims, which embodied not a one-sided and self-interested antithesis to
modern conditions but rather a complete antithesis to the very premises of
capitalism and the modern state. Thus, here was a class that was not an estate with a
positive station within the social order, but rather one that was constituted only
negatively, as an abject and ‘‘foreign’’ but inextricable presence, inherently
corrosive and always potentially subversive. This class alone revealed ‘‘a universal
character’’ and thus could invoke ‘‘only a human title’’ (1844 [1970:141]). In many
respects, then, it is the transnational mobility of migrant labor within the global
regime of capital accumulation that exceedingly and exquisitely fulfills this profile
(De Genova 2010). Indeed, to the extent that migrant labor commonly confronts
territorially defined ‘‘national’’ states with the raw force and vital energies of human
life—as labor-power—with no juridical sanction, we may recognize anew the
figure of bare life, the negative, abject counterpart to human universality and pure
potentiality, which sovereign power can only seek to banish.
8 I owe a note of gratitude to Dave Roediger for calling this text to my attention.
9 My thinking in this section in particular has been enriched by my ongoing dialog with Nahum
Chandler.
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Here, indeed, in the heterogeneous figurations of human mobility on a global
scale, we may recognize the pernicious stalking and more or less violent
regimentation of our relation as a species to the space of the planet. Above all, in
the condition of countless migrant denizens whose mobility is branded as
‘‘unauthorized’’ and ‘‘illegal,’’ we may discern anew our very species life in the
throes of a permanent crisis, enunciating the phrase that Marx deemed to be ‘‘that
genius which animates material force into political power’’: ‘‘I am nothing and I
should be everything’’ (1844 [1970:140]). Here, then, we arrive—alongside the
incessant proliferation of migrant trajectories—at a global space of mobilities that
exceeds and surpasses the epistemological and practical conceits of any nationalism.
Global space: human life and the space of the planet
It is not sufficiently appreciated that for Marx, capitalism was never apprehensible
as a European social formation that merely extended itself outward, from an
ostensible center out to its far-flung peripheries. Instead, Marx establishes
repeatedly that one must understand capital to have been global from its inception.
In one of the most forceful articulations of this perspective, in his discussion of ‘‘the
so-called primitive accumulation’’ in Volume One of Capital, Marx declares with a
flourish:
The discovery of gold and silver in America, the extirpation, enslavement and
entombment in mines of the indigenous population of that continent, the
beginnings of the conquest and plunder of India, and the conversion of Africa
into a preserve for the commercial hunting of blackskins, are all things which
characterize the dawn of the era of capitalist production. These idyllic
proceedings are the chief moments of primitive accumulation. Hard on their
heels follows the commercial war of the European nations, which has the
globe as its battlefield (1867 [1976:915; emphasis added]).
Contrary, therefore, to dominant accounts of the beginnings of modern world
history that would more predictably locate the America, India, and Africa at the
presumed ‘‘peripheries’’ of an expansive European power in its ‘‘age of discovery,’’
and for which the vast regions of the globe that were variously conquered and
colonized by Europeans are routinely relegated to a marginal status, Marx’s critique
identifies slavery, colonialism, and warfare as veritable preconditions for the very
possibility of capital accumulation. By implication, then, capitalism and a global
sociopolitical order of white supremacy were likewise mutually constitutive. It is
only with the consolidation of ‘‘the world market [dating] from the sixteenth
century’’ that ‘‘the modern history of capital starts to unfold’’ (247; emphasis
added). Indeed, the global space of the capitalist world market actually precedes the
vast majority of nation states—by centuries. Hence, we cannot presume to produce
any sort of meaningful or valid analysis of the modern world without recourse to the
conceptual category of global space as a stringent counterpoint to the dominant
geopolitical imagination, which remains imprisoned within the presuppositions of
methodological nationalism. This is, of course, not to imply that such a global space
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is in any sense ‘‘smooth’’ or frictionless, nor that nation-state spaces and their ever
increasingly militarized borders should be imagined to be somehow of little or no
consequence. Rather, it is to affirm that the global space of capital accumulation is
precisely what Arendt memorably called a ‘‘barbed-wire labyrinth’’ (1951/
1968:292), deeply scarred with the furrows and trenches that remain the planetary
legacies of colonialism, and convulsively riddled with the heterogeneous prolifer-
ation of ever more modulated, always (intrinsically) semipermeable, perforated
borders (Balibar 1993/2002; Mezzadra and Neilson 2013; Walters 2006, 2011; cf.
Harvey 1975/2001; 2000:53–72). Indeed, ‘‘without the world-configuring function
they perform,’’ clarifies Balibar, ‘‘there would be no borders—or no lasting borders’’
(1993 [2002:79]).
Apart from the recitation of historical events that confirm the planetary scope of
capital, however, it is crucial to see how the generalization of relations of
commodity exchange, which generates the conditions of possibility for a
veritable world market, establishes an effectively universal social condition of
human inter-connection which nonetheless assumes an alienated form. That is, it
couples abstract, impersonal, apparently independent, mutually indifferent personal
relations with a consummate fact of objective social inter-dependency. Thus,
capitalism introduces ‘‘a system of general social metabolism, of universal relations,
of all-round needs and universal capacities … for the first time.’’ However, ‘‘all-
round dependence of the producers on one another’’ is conjoined ‘‘with the total
isolation of their private interests’’ (1858 [1973:158]). As Marx explains,
furthermore: ‘‘Just as the division of labour creates agglomeration, combination,
cooperation [etc.]… so does private exchange create world trade, private
independence creates complete dependence on the so-called world market’’ (159).
Thus, the universality of ‘‘production on the basis of exchange values … produces
not only the alienation of the individual from himself and from others, but also the
universality and the comprehensiveness of his relations and capacities’’ (162). Here,
then, we return to the theme of universality with which Marx is centrally concerned
in his discussion of human species being. The materiality and objectivity of this
global inter-dependence are experienced within capitalism only as private
atomization (privation) and estrangement. It is nonetheless the material conse-
quence of the capitalist mode of production and mode of life that the human species
achieves a universal inter-connectedness and inter-dependency that is unprece-
dented, and therefore comes to practically inhabit a truly planetary space. Thus,
concealed within the existing mode of estranged labor and alienated life, incubating
within ‘‘society as it is,’’ Marx contends, we may discern some of the ‘‘material
conditions … prerequisite for a classless society’’ (159).
Coda: toward a Marxian anthropology?
I suggested at the outset of this essay that the prospective convergence of genuinely
critical sociopolitical inquiry with the techniques and insights of anthropology must
remain for us the locus of an urgent problem—an open question on an open horizon.
I hope to have established that such a horizon can only be adequately configured on
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a planetary scale, in a global space of mobilities, where alienated human labor in the
abstract and its practical expression as labor-power manifest nonetheless all the pure
potentiality of our collective vital energies, our creative capacities and productive
powers—as a species. Whether we may prevail over the sovereign power of the
state and capital, and ultimately succeed to inhabit our human universality as
something more than mere bare life remains the decisive challenge and the
definitive task. This is the state of emergency in which we live. But are these
questions truly and properly ‘‘anthropological’’? Only inasmuch as anthropology
may still purport to address itself to the problem of the human as such.
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